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ON THE UTILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND DATA
PROTECTION
David H. Flaherty*
PRIVACY IS LIKE freedom: we do not recognize its impor-
tance until it is taken away. In that sense, it is a personal right
that we assume we have yet take for granted-until something or
someone infringes on it. Privacy, like freedom, is difficult to define
except in the negative: the right not to be unnecessarily intruded
upon is a basic starting point. However, privacy is more than that.
I prefer the classic, century old formulation of Louis Brandeis and
Samuel Warren, "'the right to be let alone,'" since it encapsu-
lates the essence of most people's understanding, what might be
called the core content of privacy.1 But even to quote this seminal
phrase is to remind ourselves of how quaint such an expectation is
* Professor of History and Law, University of Western Ontario. This is a revised
version of an essay delivered to a Symposium on "The Right to Privacy One Hundred
Years Later," held at Case Western Reserve University School of Law on November 16-
17, 1990. I presented an earlier version at a Conference on "Canadian Reflections on the
American Constitution," University of Calgary, September 24-26, 1987.
I am especially grateful to Peter Harte, Esq., for research assistance on the Canadian
aspects of the original essay, and to Deidre Smith, then a law student at the University of
Western Ontario, for her perceptive comments on the earlier draft. Ann Knowlton Lam-
bert, Esq., of the Massachusetts bar, helped me with the American and Canadian analysis.
Elena Dempsey, currently a student-at-law at the University of Western Ontario, has
kindly discussed various aspects of the current draft with me, as have Alan Leadbeater and
Robert M. Gellman. Regrettably, none of these friends bear responsibility for the final
results.
I. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890)
(quoting T. COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d. ed. 1888)). Brandeis also
wrote:
The makers of our constitution . . . recognized the significance of man's spiri-
tual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect . . . . They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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in the late twentieth century, when privacy as a human value is
under greater attack in the public and private sectors than ever
before.2
Alan Westin has provided the most useful identification of
the interests at stake in the "data protection" component of per-
sonal privacy or informational privacy. Westin defines concern for
privacy as the desire of persons to choose freely under what cir-
cumstances and to what extent they will expose themselves, their
attitudes, and their behavior to others.3 In essence, we all seek
what the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundeserfas-
sungsgericht, characterized in 1983 as the right of informational
self-determination, which can be defined in practice as the desire
of individuals for assurances that custodians of their personal data
will comply with fair information practices.4
Historically, privacy has been largely a nonlegal concept in
the sense that individuals have asserted both broad and narrow
claims to individual privacy and could largely defend themselves
against any challengers.' At best, only marginal legal intervention
2. Warren and Brandeis also initiated the tort of invasion of privacy, which mainly
seeks to cope with false or unauthorized publicity and intrusions upon seclusion. See War-
ren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. Whatever assistance this tort may offer to individu-
als in their problems with other persons over time, it covers only a small part of the overall
privacy problem, since such actions lie against other persons and are not effective against
governments. See generally Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: a Farewell to War-
ren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983) (pointing out the many
deficiencies in the Warren and Brandeis privacy tort as applied to modern society).
3. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) ("Privacy is the claim of indi-
viduals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others."). Definitions of the amorphous con-
cept of privacy are problematic, but Westin's definition is functionally adequate for present
purposes, not least because privacy, as a fundamental value, is no easier to define than
freedom or liberty. It is useful to distinguish, as Westin does, four separate states of pri-
vacy for analytical purposes: solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve. See D. FLAHERTY.
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 7-9, 377-78 (1989). See generally
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (F. Schoeman ed. 1984) (con-
taining various essays on the meaning of privacy); Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
HARV. L. REv. 737, 805 (1989) (noting that "the right to privacy exists because democracy
must impose limits on the extent of control and direction that the state exercises over the
day-to-day conduct of individual lives.").
4. The concept of fair information practices originated in the early 1970s in both the
United Kingdom and the United States. Such rules serve as the groundwork for all na-
tional and state laws on data protection. The basic principles include collection limitation,
data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual
participation, and accountability. ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GUIDELINES ON
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1981).
5. Referring to privacy claims as nonlegal simply acknowledges that the search for
privacy is influenced by factors that are often perceived as being nonlegal, such as the
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to protect privacy interests occurred, as in common law prosecu-
tions for eavesdropping. 6 This has changed dramatically since the
early phases of industrialization in the nineteenth century. Despite
one's best-intentioned efforts to maintain privacy, the operation of
external laws and authorities has become essential for its preser-
vation. Successive phases of mechanization and automation, from
the telegraph and the telephone to computers and telecommunica-
tions devices, have challenged privacy in ways that few individuals
can overcome alone.7
Despite the acknowledged leading role of American commen-
tators in inventing the legal "right to privacy" in the late nine-
teenth century and the extraordinary expansion of the scope of the
right, it is important not to view problems of privacy protection
solely in terms of the framework of American constitutionalism,
since challenges to a human value that are endemic in advanced
industrial societies are also at issue. Although the legal and consti-
tutional right to privacy is very well developed in the United
States, certain aspects of systemic and systematic data protection
are much more advanced in other countries." At the very least, it
is instructive to review the means by which other jurisdictions seek
to protect privacy interests.
It is also useful to recognize at the outset that the legal pro-
tection of privacy takes many forms. Constitutional modes of pri-
vacy protection are either explicit in a constitutional document or
implicit: that is, judge-made or, more neutrally, judicially recog-
nized. These rights, then, evolve on a case-by-case basis, normally
involving the application of a balancing test that some in the
United States would argue is customarily loaded in favor of values
that compete with privacy, such as the goals of reducing fraud or
creating a drug free society.' In recent years there has also been a
architecture of homes, town planning, the character of family, neighborhood, and commu-
nity life, communications and correspondence, institutional life affecting individuals, and
the entire role of governments, law enforcers, and courts in human existence.
6. For an example of the law imposing penalties for eavesdropping in 17th century
New England, see D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 89 (1972).
7. See D. SEP. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 102-13 (1978)
(calling for new public policy measures to protect the individual's right to privacy in the
face of twentieth century technologies); see also Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth
Century America, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1892 (1981).
8. See infra notes 48-59 (discussing the right to data protection in Germany) and
notes 60-109 (discussing the right to privacy in Canada).
9. See Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 825, 826-27 (1989).
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remarkable proliferation of claims for "privacy," as individuals
with various perceived problems seek a protective umbrella. Thus,
recent American privacy debates and cases have touched on many
sensitive issues: abortion, AIDS, drug testing, workplace surveil-
lance, electronic surveillance of public washrooms, employment
privacy rights, medical privacy, privacy and the press, communi-
cations privacy, library records, caller identification telephone sys-
tems, sexual privacy, and residential privacy.' 0
The essential distinction between privacy protection and data
protection, or informational privacy, is not commonly understood,
especially in North America. Data protection is especially con-
cerned with controlling the collection, use, and dissemination of
personal information. Since 1970 legislatures in Europe and North
America have responded to widespread fears about the impact of
computers on data collection, linkage, and use by enacting protec-
tive laws. These laws primarily seek to control the government's
collection, use, and dissemination of personal information by
means of codes of fair information practices.
The United States' Privacy Act of 197411 is a leading and
influential example of a data protection law. England's Data Pro-
tection Act of 1984 has the advantage, in the English-speaking
world, of being properly titled.' 2 Although the goal of the act is to
protect privacy, the word never appears in it. This is an improve-
ment on using the word privacy in a law without any attempt at
definition. In addition to such general laws, most countries, and
10. See V. SCHACTER & T. GEIDT, DRUGS AND ALCOHOL IN THE WORKPLACE: LE-
GAL DEVELOPMENTS AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES (2d ed. 1989) (analyzing recent sub-
stance abuse legislation and key legal issues concerning privacy and drugs in the work-
place); DeBenedictis, E-Mail Snoops, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1980, at 26, 27 (concerning privacy
issues and electronic mail); Doss, Police Management: Sexual Misconduct and the Right
to Privacy, 17 J. POLICE Sci. ADMIN. 194 (1990) (examining the right to privacy for police
officers); Ezzard, State Constitutional Privacy Rights Past Webster-Broader Protection
Against Abortion Restrictions?, 67 DEN. U.L. REV. 401 (1990) (analysis of how the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Webster has shifted privacy issues concerning restrictions on the
right to have an abortion to state law); Schulman, AIDS Workplace Law and Policy: A
Systematic Analysis, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 543 (1990) (offering an indepth exami-
nation of how the AIDS epidemic has effected privacy issues in the workplace); Note,
State Prohibition of Fetal Experimentation and the Fundamental Right of Privacy, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1073 (1988) (discussing how privacy issues have developed in the context
of fetal experimentation).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
12. Data Protection Act 1984, c. 35, reprinted in HALSBURY'S STATS. OF ENGLAND
AND WALES 6:831 (4th ed. 1985); see D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 377-78 (criticizing
the failure to distinguish between the broad need for protection of personal privacy and the
need for data protection).
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especially the United States, have fashioned specific sectoral legis-
lation that applies general fair information practices to precise
data protection issues.13 Such general and specific statutes are
making the most significant contribution to the protection of all
forms of individual privacy in advanced industrial societies
today. 14
Thus, this paper addresses two questions. First, what kinds of
constitutional rights to privacy are necessary, desirable, and bene-
ficial? Second, are systemic and sectoral modes of statutory data
protection also essential?
It is advantageous for Americans and Canadians, who are the
focus of my concern, to enjoy as many forms of protection for
personal privacy as possible, including full-fledged constitutional
rights to personal privacy, general and special data protection
laws, and common law rights to privacy sounding in tort. Unhap-
pily, few western countries have reached that potentially auspi-
cious state.15 The United States' deficiency is in failing to create
independent agencies to ensure that privacy acts in the public sec-
tor are actually enforced. When explicit constitutional and statu-
tory protection for privacy exists in common law countries, indi-
viduals are in a much better position to assert their human rights
in the public and private arenas and in the court system.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES
While this article cannot fully explore the emergence of
surveilance societies, it can provide a glimpse of what is happen-
ing. Information societies are becoming surveillance societies.16
We are increasingly subject to surveillance by all kinds of per-
sonal information banks in both the public and private sectors.
The various automated data bases now in existence make possible
fairly integrated monitoring and profiling of the lives of most indi-
viduals. The proliferation of such information banks poses the
most fundamental challenge to privacy interests, because of their
13. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988); Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
14. See D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 371-77 (discussing the importance of legisla-
tion and its role in protecting privacy).
15. But see HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F (1988) (creating the Office of Information Prac-
tices within the Department of the Attorney General as a center for access and privacy
policies); D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 305-06, 359, 361-67 (discussing successful and
significant legislation that has been enacted).
16. See D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at I-I1.
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mind-boggling ability to collect, store, and disseminate data.17 The
United States government is the custodian of more personal infor-
mation than any other institution in the world. The three largest
American credit information companies each maintain identifiable
data on 150 million individuals. Computer systems routinely mon-
itor the activities of employees."" In North America, the applica-
tion of information technology is galloping ahead of regulation
and control, especially in the private sector, resulting in significant
privacy anxieties among the general public. 9
Citizens of various totalitarian regimes, such as China and
the Soviet Union before Gorbachev, have been fortunate that the
surveillance aspirations of their leaderships have not been
matched by technological capacity, although the Stasi in the Ger-
man Democratic Republic made a considerable effort in that di-
rection.20 But it was only a matter of time before some wealthier
country consciously chose to create a true surveillance society.
Thailand, a constitutional monarchy dominated by the military, is
the first out of the blocks in the 1990s. It has inaugurated a cen-
tralized database system to monitor vital information on each of
its 55 million citizens. "[T]he system includes a Population Identi-
fication Number (PIN) with a required computer-readable ID
card with photo, thumbprint, and imbedded personal data."'"
Such Personal Identification Numbers are the key to creating a
surveillance society. The Thai system will store date of birth, an-
cestral history, and family composition and is designed to track
voting patterns, domestic and foreign travel, and social welfare.22
Networked terminals will eventually permit 12,000 users to have
access to this relational database. Forebodingly, the Smithsonian
Institution subsequently chose the Thai Ministry of the Interior as
the recipient of the second annual Computerworld Smithsonian
17. See Data Protection, Computers, and Changing Information Practices: Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the
Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).
18. Kilborn, Workers Using Computers Find "Big Brother" Inside, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
19. See L. HARRIS & Assocs., THE EQUIFAX REPORT ON CONSUMERS IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE (1990).
20. See East Germany's Stasi: Where Have All the Files Gone?, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 22, 1990, at 55. The existing Stasi files pose fundamental challenges for data protec-
tion in the Federal Republic of Germany. Keeping the files secret is not popular with East
Germans, believing that access to their files is a fair information right. Id.
21. Smith, True Colors, PRIVACY JOURNAL, July 1990, at 1, 1.
22. Id.
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Award for innovative information technology.23
Since automated information systems are so pervasive, it is
important to think about the implications of the use of these sys-
tems for the protection of our human rights. Despite the advent of
privacy and data protection laws and agencies, there is some evi-
dence that data protection is to date only an illusion.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES
As a Canadian, I especially admire the role of the Supreme
Court of the United States in slowly developing a judicially recog-
nized constitutional right to privacy. The important qualification,
however, is that the Supreme Court has never made a broad gen-
eral finding of a constitutional right to privacy, as some commen-
tators had expected it to do in the 1960s, nor has the Constitution
been explicitly amended to this effect, nor is it on anyone's
agenda, nor has it even been contemplated. Thus, Americans do
not have an explicit federal constitutional right to privacy, in con-
trast to the situation in some states.24 The California Constitution,
as amended in 1972, provides that residents of the state have a
right to privacy: "All people are by nature free and independent,
and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of en-
joying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy."' 25 On the basis of such constitutional language, indi-
viduals can use the courts to assert claims for privacy against ei-
ther state or private entities. Despite the difficulties and, espe-
cially, the costs of successfully asserting privacy claims in any
court, these claims should be encouraged in Canada and other
23. Id.; see Elmer-Dewitt, Peddling Big Brother, TIME. June 24, 1991, at 62.
24. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (stating that "[e]very natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his previous life .... ").
Privacy is also protected under descriptive state laws. See Arzt, Privacy Law in Massachu-
setts: Territorial, Informational and Decisional Rights, 70 MASS. L. REv. 173 (1985)
(drawing interesting distinctions among territorial privacy [homes, cars, bodies, tele-
phones], informational privacy [criminal, medical, employment records], and decisional
privacy [lifestyle, procreation]).
25. CAL CONsT. art. I, § 1; cf. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d
1034, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1989) (recognizing that privacy interests guaranteed by the
state constitution may be affected by private actions; but holding that a preemployment
drug testing policy does not infringe upon those privacy interests). See generally Gerstein,
California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the Protection of Pri-
vate Life, 9 HASTINGS CONsr. L.Q. 385 (1981-82) (explaining the relatively advanced de-
velopment of the right to privacy in California).
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common law countries as an ultimate guarantor of individual pri-
vacy rights.2
The history of the judicial recognition of the right to privacy
under the United States Constitution is important because it indi-
cates the context in which courts are more likely to acknowledge
privacy claims. Claims to privacy rights have been recognized in
federal litigation at least since the late nineteenth century,27 but it
was only in Griswold v. Connecticut that Justice Douglas, writing
the opinion for the court, asserted the existence of a right of pri-
vacy against the state predating the Bill of Rights.28 Douglas ar-
gued that several amendments to the Constitution explicitly and
implicitly embodied a series of protections for privacy interests .2
The factual setting for the Griswold decision, as is so often
the case in major Supreme Court privacy opinions, was appropri-
ately ludicrous: the state of Connecticut had made it a crime for
any person, even married couples, to use contraceptives. Physi-
cians and family planning centers were liable under the statute
and vulherable to criminal prosecution as aiders, abettors, and co-
conspirators for providing their patients with information concern-
ing birth control.3" In its decision striking down the criminal stat-
ute, the Court essentially created a right to "marital" privacy,
which has evolved into a significant right of intimate association."1
Of course, Griswold is often assailed as a classic case of judicial
activism, certainly something that Robert Bork would have liked
26. Since Warren and Brandeis used English cases to make claims for a legal right
to privacy, it is ironic that there is neither a constitutional nor judicially recognized right to
privacy in Britain. See generally W. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN (1979) (discussing the
historical basis of the right to privacy in Britain); Seipp, English Judicial Recognition of a
Right of Privacy, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1983) (discussing the lack of judicial
recognition of the right to privacy).
27. See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
SuP. CT. REV. 215-18 (discussing the early fourth amendment right to privacy cases).
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Although the decision was seven to two, there were six
opinions written for the majority. Douglas's first draft was based on a right of association,
even though he had been advocating a constitutional right of privacy for some years; Jus-
tice Brennan suggested the switch to privacy grounds. See B. SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUB-
LISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 227-39 (1985).
29. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-86.
30. Id. at 479-80.
31. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 95-100, 110-26 (1990) (arguing that the real issue in Griswold is the Court's desire
to create a new privacy right); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J.
624, 626-52 (1980) (discussing Supreme Court's development of intimate association as a
privacy right).
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to reverse.32 Once Justice Douglas let the horse out of the barn, so
to speak, litigants have been able to assert privacy claims in other
settings with mixed success. 3 Privacy claims should not always
prevail, but a climate should be encouraged where they can be
advanced and considered in the judicial and legislative process.
The Supreme Court took its most significant step in develop-
ing the constitutional right to privacy in Roe v. Wade in 1973. 8,
In that instance it was a woman's right to choose an abortion that
became the vehicle for enunciating a right to privacy. Justice
Blackmun wrote for the majority that the right to privacy "is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." 5 In Roe the Court emphasized that
the woman's right to privacy in reproductive choice is not absolute
or unqualified as against state interests in regulation of abortion;3
6
this is the standard balancing test that courts apply in cases in
which claims to privacy are asserted.37 It is also true that the right
to privacy is most often given primacy by the courts in situations
where the interests of intimate association are at stake rather than
when a person is attempting to assert a right to privacy against
the state or as a shield for alleged wrong-doing."
The Supreme Court's recent unanimous decision in United
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Free-
32. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 7-11 (1971) (characterizing the Griswold opinion as failing to justify the creation of a
right of privacy).
33. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting a privacy claim regard-
ing sexual relations between homosexuals); United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 438 (1976)
(rejecting a privacy claim regarding banking records).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). This again was a 7 to 2 decision. The holding was reaf-
firmed in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983).
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. Again the ostensible context of the case encouraged judi-
cial intervention: an unmarried twenty-one year old waitress was gang raped but could not
have an abortion under state law. The victim has recently denied that she was in fact
raped; she was so frustrated and bitter at being denied an abortion that she invented a
compelling circumstance, which was not mentioned in her suit. Changing Stories, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 1987, § 4, at 6, col. 5.
36. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-65.
37. Reliance on the right to privacy to achieve the goal of a woman's right to choose
may create more political pressures on this admittedly amorphous concept than it can bear
in its current state. Anti-abortionists are forced into an attack on privacy as a value. In this
sense, it is advantageous that the equivalent Canadian decision on abortion grounded free-
dom of choice in section seven of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, especially the wo-
man's right to "security of the person." Regina v. Morgentaler, I S.C.R. 30, 34 (1988).
38. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (effectively denying prisoners a
right to privacy).
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dom of the Press9 furnishes grounds for optimism with respect to
informational privacy. The case arose when a CBS news reporter
and a media rights advocacy group filed a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act ("FOIA") request for criminal identification records, also
called "rap sheets," from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") concerning Charles Medico, who was alleged to have
criminal connections. 40 The issue was "whether the disclosure of
the contents of such a file to a third party 'could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy'" within the meaning of the exemptions to the FOIA.41 Al-
though the FBI treats rap sheets as confidential, much of the con-
tents are a matter of public record. In fact, the request in this case
was for "matters of public record." 42
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens first noted the
Court's previous holding that privacy cases "'in fact involved at
least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the in-
terest in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions.' " The former was at stake in this case. Stevens came close
to reliance on informational self-determination in his statement
that "both the common law and the literal understandings of pri-
vacy encompass the individual's control of information concerning
his or her person."44 The Court determined that "a strong privacy
interest inheres in the non-disclosure of compiled computerized in-
formation . . . . 45 Furthermore:
we hold as a categorical matter that a third party's request for
law-enforcement records or information about a private citizen
can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen's privacy, and
that when the request seeks no "official information" about a
Government agency, but merely records that the Government
happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is
"unwarranted." 46
Although Reporters Committee deals specifically with the inter-
pretation of an exemption to the FOIA, it has the direct effect of
39. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
40. Id. at 757.
41. Id. at 754 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(c) (1988)).
42. Id. at 757.
43. Id. at 762 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977)).
44. Id. at 763.
45. Id. at 766.
46. Id. at 780.
840 [Vol. 41:831
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identifying and confirming the individual's interest in informa-
tional privacy. Washington attorney Robert Belair made a key
point about the importance of this decision:
Previously, the court had resisted finding a privacy interest in
records unless the records contained intimate, personal informa-
tion, such as health or family information, and unless the
records had been held in more or less strict confidence ...
What the court found in Reporters Committee is that there is
an expectation of privacy in a computerized, comprehensive rec-
ord of all of an individual's activities-but not necessarily an
expectation of privacy in a single criminal event. 47
III. THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION AND INFORMATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY
The approach advocated in this essay for assuring constitu-
tional and legal protection for privacy has been very much influ-
enced by my understanding of developments in the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Germany has a scheme of integrated privacy
and data protection laws at the federal and state levels, based on
constitutional language48 and judicial decisions,49 that is a model
for federal systems offering protection for personal privacy. 50 Arti-
cle 1(1) of the German Constitution provides that "[t]he dignity
of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all
state authority." ' Article 2 further states: "Everyone has the
right to the free development of his personality insofar as he does
not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional
order or the moral code."5
In 1983 the German Federal Constitutional Court interpreted
these articles as creating a general right of private personality,
which can include a right, to privacy. 53 It did so in the context of
an enormous debate over the constitutionality of the population
47. Belair, Redefining Information Privacy, PRIVACY JOURNAL, July 1989, at 7, 7
(emphasis in original).
48. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., C. civ. art. 9 (France) This article, adding to the French Civil Code a
statutory recognition of the right to personal privacy in the sense that everyone has a right
to respect for his private life, parallels the German scheme. See A. VITALIS, INFORMATIQUE,
POUVOIR Er LIBERTtS 145-58 (2d ed. 1988).
51. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. I (W. Ger.).
52. Id. art. II.
53. See D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 86-90.
1991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
census originally scheduled for that year." The Court unani-
mously held that Germans have a right of informational self-de-
termination. As Professor Spiros Simitis has written, "Since this
ruling . . . it has been an established fact in this country that the
Constitution gives the individual the right to decide when and
under what circumstances his personal data may be processed. 55
However, even under the German court's decision an individ-
ual is not free to decide whether to give information to the govern-
ment: "Rather than giving exclusive control or a property interest
to the data subject, the right of informational self-determination
compels the State to organize data processing so that personal au-
tonomy will be respected."56 In a highly legalistic society, this will
require that all data protection activities be regulated by specific
legislation. Another possible result is that individuals will have a
demonstrable right to protection against infringement of privacy
occasioned by such activities as the population census.
The German Federal Constitutional Court has also effectively
given constitutional standing to data protection agencies by insist-
ing that their existence is essential for data collection to occur.
According to Dr. Reinhold Baumann, then the Federal Data Pro-
tection Commissioner, "the Court said that the institution of an
independent data protection commission is an indispensable re-
quirement for the effective protection of the individual's right to
determine the use of his personal data, the so-called 'fundamental
right of informational self-determination.' "7
The most important impact of the Court's decision on the
Census Act is that, for the first time anywhere, data protection
now has a clear constitutional basis, and a right to informational
self-determination has been created. The constitutionality of any
law can be challenged on the basis of the Constitutional Court's
decision. It will still require a number'of years for the implications
of this decision for sectoral legislation at the federal and state
54. See id. at 79-83, 86-90 (discussing the public controversies and the eventual
postponement of the census on grounds of potential invasion of privacy).
55. Hoffmann, Controversy Over Banks' Role as Suppliers of Customer Informa-
tion, German Tribune, Jan. 29, 1984, at 8, col. 1, 9, at col. 3 (quoting Professor Simitis).
56. Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: To-
wards an American Right of Informational Self-Determination, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 675,
690 (1989). For a discussion of the meaning of this right, see id. at 689-94.
57. Press Statement of Dr. Reinhold Baumann on the occasion of the submission of
the Sixth Report on the Activities of the Federal Data Protection Commissioner (Jan. 24,
1984) (on file with the Office of the Federal Data Protection Commissioner, Bonn).
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levels to be realized.P8 The revision of the German Data Protec-
tion Act, completed in September 1990, was a major step forward
in implementing the principles of the 1983 census case.59
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN CANADA
With respect to protection of personal privacy in Canada, it
must be emphasized that Canadians do not have an explicit con-
stitutional right to privacy under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms of 1982.60 In this condition, Canada is true to its
British constitutional heritage of often avoiding the entrenchment
of basic rights. In the Special Joint Senate-House of Commons
Committee on the Constitution in 1981,, David Crombie, then a
Progressive-Conservative Member of Parliament, proposed the in-
clusion of a constitutional right of privacy in the Charter, but this
poorly worded amendment was defeated by a vote of fourteen to
ten.6'
The only Canadian province offering some degree of explicit
constitutional protection for privacy is Quebec. Article 5 of the
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, an ordinary
statute, enacted in 1975, guarantees that "[e]very person has a
right to respect for his private life."62 Unfortunately, in the words
of Patrick Glenn, "the effect of the Charter is not such that courts
will be obliged to test the validity of legislation for consistency
with the right to privacy."6 3 In 1987, however, Quebec amended
its Civil Code to include basic principles related to respect for in-
dividual privacy. The code now specifies that "every person has a
right to the respect of his reputation and privacy. No one may
invade the privacy of another person except with the consent of
58. Candor requires me to add that the process is not moving as quickly as data
protectors would like. For helpful descriptions of recent developments, see Schwartz, supra
note 56, at 698-701.
59. The most important change guarantees the independence of the Federal Data
Protection Commissioner by requiring that the Bundestag elect him or her on the nomina-
tion of the government as rather than simply allowing the government to appoint the com-
missioner. See D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 40-43, 391-94.
60. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. app. II, No. 44, Schedule B. (Can. 1985).
61. See COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, OPEN AND SHUT: ENHANCING THE RIGHT TO
KNOW AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 91 (1987) (discussing the history of Crombie's
amendment).
62. QUE. REV. STAT. C-12, ch. 6, 5.5 (1975).
63. Glenn, The Right to Privacy in Quebec Law, in ASPECTS OF PRIVACY LAW 63,
63 (D. Gibson ed. 1980).
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the person or his heirs or unless it is permitted by law."' 4 Invasion
of the "privacy of a person" is defined very broadly to include the
interception of private communications, unauthorized publicity,
and "[o]bserving a person in his private life by any means."65 Fi-
nally, the revised code specifically incorporates a series of fair in-
formation practices for the maintenance of personal files.66 Thus,
residents of Quebec will soon have the strongest legal protections
for privacy of any Canadian province. Unlike other jurisdictions in
North America, Quebec is also considering general data protec-
tion regulations for the private sector.67
Several Canadian provinces have "privacy acts" that are
analogous to the American invasion of privacy torts. Enacted in
the 1960s, the Canadian privacy acts have been seldom used, al-
though they could be useful because of their broad language, for
individuals who want to press claims against the private sector. 68
Thus, the Manitoba Privacy Act generally states that "a person
who substantially, unreasonably, and without claim of right, vio-
lates the privacy of another person, commits a tort against another
person. ' 69 Examples of invasion of privacy cited in this law in-
clude surveillance of a person, residence, or a vehicle by any
means.7 0 Moreover, an action may be brought without proof of
damage.
Although the federal Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not
explicit about privacy, certain sections have been used by the Su-
preme Court of Canada to recognize a right to privacy. Most no-
table is section eight (the Canadian version of the fourth amend-
ment): "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure."' 71 Privacy issues have also been recognized in
respect of section seven, the right not to be deprived of security of
64. Respect of Reputation and Privacy, 18 QUE. REV. STAT. ch. 3 (1985).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally Laperriare, Lemasson, P61adeau, Bureau & Martin, The Legal
Control of Personal Data in the Private Sectors of Quebec and Canada, 3 CAN. J.L. &
Soc'y 247 (1988) (discussing the need for a legislative response to the personal databank
situation).
68. See Osborne, The Privacy Acts of British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatche-
wan, in ASPECTS OF PRIVACY LAW 110 (D. Gibson ed. 1980).
69. R.S.M. 1987, ch. P-125.
70. Id. Inserting examples in the act itself helps to make up for the fact that none of
the "privacy" legislation considered in this essay defines the concept of privacy. See D.
FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 377-78.
71. CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS Vol. II, § 8 (Can.).
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the person, except in accordance with the principles of fundamen-
tal justice;72 section 10(b),1 3 the right to retain and instruct coun-
sel; and section 11 (b), 7 the right to be tried within a reasonable
time. In the future, privacy may emerge as an issue regarding the
"fundamental freedoms" set out in section two: "a) freedom of
conscience and religion; b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and
expression ....
Privacy has emerged as an important concept at several levels
in constitutional litigation, and Canadian high court judges, like
their American counterparts, are using privacy language in their
holdings and dicta under the Charter regime. First, the court must
recognize the privacy component of a specific right or freedom.
Once the court determines that a privacy right has been infringed,
the court must ask under section one of the Charter whether the
limits imposed on privacy are "reasonable" and can be "demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society."'7 6 Such a quali-
fication on a human right can serve as a significant barrier to suc-
cessful litigation. However, the court has set a high standard for
section one analysis. The final question before the court is what
remedy is available to enforce the right.
The Supreme Court of Canada initially recognized an indi-
vidual's reasonable expectation of privacy against governmental
encroachment in Hunter v. Southam, Inc.78 In fact, it is clear af-
ter this seminal decision that section eight of the Charter is 'all
72. Id. § 7.
73. Id. § 10(b).
74. Id. § Il(b).
75. Id. § 2.
76. Regina v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103, 104 (1986).
77. In Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada enunciated the test for any section one
inquiry under the Charter. To establish that a limit is reasonable and "demonstrably justi-
fied in a free and democratic society," two criteria must be satisfied. Id. at 104. First, the
objective of the law in question must be pressing and substantial. Second, the party relying
on section one must also prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the means chosen are
reasonable and demonstrably .justified. To decide this, the court has devised a "form of
proportionality test," which consists of three components. Id. at 106. First, the measures
adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be
arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. Second, the means, even if ration-
ally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair "as little as possible" the
right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of
the measures and the objective. Id.; see Regina v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd., I S.C.R. 295
(1985) (setting forth the test discussed in Oakes).
78. 2 S.C.R. 145, 159-60 (1984); see also James Richardson & Sons v. Ministry of
Nat'l Revenue, I S.C.R. 614 (1984) (analyzing the extent to which inquiries can be made
into the trading activities of brokers).
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about privacy. 9 In Hunter, government investigators searched the
premises and files (excluding files in the newsroom) of the
Edmonton Journal in the course of an inquiry under the Com-
bines Investigation Act. The Southam newspaper chain success-
fully challenged the constitutionality of section ten of this federal
statute, which by its terms purported to permit very wide-ranging
searches and seizures.8"
Speaking for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Brian Dick-
son stated that the function of a constitution, as opposed to a stat-
ute, "is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exer-
cise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a
Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual
rights and liberties." ' The court determined that section eight
"guarantees a broad and general right to be secure from unrea-
sonable search and seizure"; 82 its purpose is "to protect individu-
als from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy."8 3
The Canadian Supreme Court adopted the approach of its
American counterpart in interpreting the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution, emphasizing the right to privacy
in Katz v. United States.84
This limitation on the right guaranteed by § 8, whether it is
expressed negatively as freedom from "unreasonable" search
and seizure, or positively as an entitlement to a "reasonable"
expectation of privacy, indicates that an assessment must be
made as to whether in a particular situation the public's interest
in being left alone by government must give way to the govern-
ment's interest in intruding on the individual's privacy in order
to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement.85
79. See Stone, The Inadequacy of Privacy: Hunter v. Southam and the Meaning of
"unreasonable" in Section 8 of the Charter, 34 McGILL L.J. 685 (1989) (discussing
Hunter and the privacy law surrounding the decision).
80. The Charter only protects individuals against "government" action. It does not
offer a remedy against private sector abuses, unless a claim can be advanced indirectly, for
instance by attacking the government bodies that regulate various companies.
81. Hunter, 2 S.C.R. at 155.
82. Id. at 158.
83. Id. at 160.
84. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Canadian court nevertheless cautioned that "Ameri-
can decisions can be transplanted to the Canadian context only with the greatest caution."
Hunter, 2 S.C.R. at 161. Equally relevant is an understanding of how the Supreme Court
of the United States has eroded the Katz standard in its subsequent decisions. See Katz, In
Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549 (1990)
(discussing the dilution of fourth amendment protection in America).
85. Hunter, 2 S.C.R. at 159-60.
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Chief Justice Dickson further wrote that "the individual's right to
privacy will be breached only where the appropriate standard has
been met, and the interests of the state are thus demonstrably su-
perior." 86 The government must make a showing, based on an ob-
jective standard, that the invasion of privacy rights is warranted:
The state's interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to
prevail over the individual's interest in being left alone at the
point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion. His-
tory has confirmed the appropriateness of this requirement as
the threshold for subordinating the expectation of privacy to the
needs of law enforcement. Where the state's interest is not sim-
ply law enforcement as, for instance, where state security is in-
volved, or where the individual's interest is not simply his expec-
tation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threatens his
bodily integrity, the relevant standard might well be a different
one.
87
The reference to "bodily integrity" seems particularly propitious
for defenses against such invasive practices as drug testing
through urinalysis.
In general, the Hunter decision gives constitutional recogni-
tion to an individual's right to assert a reasonable expectation of
privacy vis-A-vis the government. Justice G. V. La Forest asserts
that, after Hunter, the onus shifts to the government upon the
showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 8 As documented
below, courts have begun to apply this standard in a wide variety
of cases as a foundation for further definition of the right to pri-
vacy. Hunter is thus directly comparable in importance to Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.9
In The Queen v. Dyment,90 a blood sample was taken from an
emergency patient without his consent or knowledge. Justice La
Forest, writing for himself and the Chief Justice,91 identified three
areas where privacy claims could be affirmed against governmen-
tal encroachments on the basis of section eight: those involving
86. Id. at 161-62.
87. Id. at 167-68.
88. G.V. La Forest, Privacy, 7 (July 17, 1990) (unpublished manuscript of a speech
to the Canadian Human Rights Foundation Summer School, University of Prince Edward
Island).
89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. 2 S.C.R. 417 (1988).
91. Although the majority in this case was five to one, Justices Beetz, Lamer, and
Wilson simply decided that because the seizure was unlawful, the evidence should be ex-
cluded. Id. at 440-41.
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territorial or spatial aspects, those related to the person, and those
that arise in the informational context. 2 In Dyment, La Forest
wrote:
[T]he restraints imposed on government to pry into the lives of
the citizen go to the essence of a democratic state. . . . Inva-
sions of privacy must be prevented, and where privacy is out-
weighed by other societal claims, there must be clear rules set-
ting forth the conditions in which it can be violated. This is
especially true of law enforcement, which involves the freedom
of the subject.93
La Forest stated that privacy claims were based on the need to
protect the sanctity of human dignity and the dignity and integ-
rity of the individual. 4 Moreover, La Forest argued that the pri-
vacy of the individual,
like other Charter rights, must be interpreted in a broad and
liberal manner so as to secure the citizen's right to a reasonable
expectation of privacy against governmental encroachments. Its
spirit must not be constrained by narrow legalistic classifications
based on notions of property and the like which served to protect
this fundamental human value in earlier times.95
The La Forest opinion in Dyment emphasized that section eight
not only prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures but further
guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Regina v. Duarte,96 a Supreme Court decision in a drug case,
addressed the issue of whether surreptitious electronic surveillance
of an individual by the state, without a judicial warrant but with
the agreement of one of the participants, constitutes an unreason-
able search or seizure under section eight of the Charter. Writing
for the majority, Justice La Forest noted that Hunter "instructs
us that the primary value served by section 8 is privacy" and that
92. Id. at 428-30. La Forest's 1990 speech usefully reviews how the Supreme Court
has tried to balance privacy and law enforcement interests with respect to private dwell-
ings, random stopping of motor vehicles, bodily searches (fingerprinting and blood sam-
ples), and searches at the border. See G.V. La Forest, supra note 88, at 9-16.
93. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. at 427-28, 430.
94. See id. at 429 (underlining the "seriousness of a violation of the sanctity of a
person's body" as constituting an "affront to human dignity"); see also G.V. La Forest,
supra note 88, at 8 (discussing his opinion in Dyment).
95. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. at 426.
96. 65 D.L.R.4th 240 (1990). In Duarte, the police rented an apartment for a police
informer and equipped it with audio-visual equipment, which was used to record a cocaine
transaction involving the accused, an undercover officer, and the informer.
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its spirit "must not be constrained by narrow legalistic classifica-
tions. .... If one is to give § 8 the purposive meaning attributed
to it by Hunter v. Southam Inc., one can scarcely imagine a state
activity more dangerous to individual privacy than electronic sur-
veillance. . . . "9 La Forest interpreted section eight as establish-
ing "our right to be free from unreasonable invasions of our right
to privacy." 98
La Forest viewed the problem of participant surveillance as
follows:
[I]f the state were free, at its sole discretion, to make permanent
electronic recordings of our private communications, there
would be no meaningful residuum to our right to live our lives
free from surveillance. . . . A society which exposed us, at the
whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent electronic
recording made of our words every time we opened our mouths
might be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be one in
which privacy no longer had any meaning ...
It thus becomes necessary to strike a reasonable balance be-
tween the right of individuals to be left alone and the right of
the state to intrude on privacy in the furtherance of its responsi-
bilities for law enforcement.
In a dramatic reversal of contemporary police practices, the court
then determined that a reasonable expectation of privacy requires
prior judicial authorization of surveillance by an agency of the
state.99
Even though the Supreme Court of Canada uses privacy lan-
guage with considerable positive effect in its interpretation of the
Charter, the idea of amending the Charter to create an explicit
constitutional right to privacy has much to recommend it. The
Justice Committee of the House of Commons, in its 1987 report
on the revision of the federal Privacy Act, suggested that serious
consideration should be given to creating a simple constitutional
right to personal privacy. 100 The present political climate makes
97. Id. at 249.
98. In an extended discussion of Duarte, La Forest declared: "If the State were free
to record at its whim all of our private conversations, then the concept of privacy would
have no meaning." G.V. LaForest, supra note 88, at 18. La Forest regards Duarte as being
concerned with informational privacy. He further expounded on the risks of unauthorized
electronic surveillance, without advance judicial authorization, in his majority opinion in
Wong v. The Queen (judgment rendered Nov. 22, 1990).
99. See Making, Wiring of officers curbed by rulings, Globe & Mail, Nov. 12,
1990, at AS, col. 1.
100. COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 91.
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such a specialized amendment unlikely for the foreseeable future,
since, as in the United States, it is hard to imagine the issue be-
coming such a societal priority.
However, there are some disadvantages to developing a con-
stitutional right to privacy in Canada. Clearly, it would contribute
to the increase of litigiousness and legal costs that are already sig-
nificant under the Charter, as more and more citizens attempt to
assert their rights in the courts. 101 Moreover, the concept of pri-
vacy is so amorphous, ill-defined, and diverse that its use could
further stimulate peculiar and time-consuming claims. The public
is also likely to lack enthusiasm for the privacy claims of such
unsympathetic individuals as alleged drug offenders. Nevertheless,
promoting a constitutional right appears to be the best way to let
individuals seek to protect their privacy in the face of novel
challenges.
Such an explicit amendment to the Charter is preferable to
depending entirely on the judiciary to breathe life into the Charter
through decisions like Hunter. Politicians, having stumbled into
such innovative reforms as the Charter and laws allowing access
to government information, are unlikely to think that it is in the
government's interest to allow the people to enjoy a constitution-
ally recognized right to privacy, since it can be so easily used
against the government itself. Even if politicians can be persuaded
of the value of privacy, their advisors are likely to be much less
enchanted. This simply completes a circle in which the public re-
quires entrenched, preferably explicit, rights of which they cannot
be deprived.
The experience with the judicial recognition and application
of a right to privacy in American federal and state constitutional
law justifies some optimism about the utility and desirability of
such a constitutional right in Canada. At present, the future of
Canada's constitutional privacy is in the hands of sensitive judges
and skilled advocates.
101. Such developments are desirable, since, by American standards, rights con-
sciousness is underdeveloped in Canada, as are civil liberties litigation and private human
rights organizations. For example, the Toronto-based Canadian Civil Liberties Association
and Quebec's Ligue des Droits et Libert6s, because of very limited human and financial
resources, are not in a position to match the efforts of an organization like the American
Civil Liberties Union and its local offshoots.
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V. DATA PROTECTION IN CANADA
Since the absence of an explicit common law or Charter-
based right to personal privacy in Canada remains an impediment
to the protection of individual human rights, the specific kinds of
protections incorporated in such legislation as the federal Privacy
Act are increasingly important and, furthermore, distinguish Ca-
nada from the United States.
At present, the federal government,102 Quebec, 10 3 and Onta-
rio'0 4 have enacted "privacy laws" that are, in effect, data protec-
tion statutes for controlling the collection and use of personal in-
formation by the public sector. They incorporate the fair
information practices that are standard in all such laws in West-
ern countries.105 Moreover, these data protection acts do not ex-
plicitly address the evolving challenges to privacy posed by such
technologies as electronic surveillance in the workplace and drug
testing, except to the extent that these practices require the collec-
tion and storage of personal data, but they are capable of expan-
sion in that direction. In 1987 the Justice Committee of the House
of Commons supported movement in that direction under the Pri-
vacy Act. 06 However, it appears the current Progressive-Con-
servative government will not support the development of the Pri-
vacy Act into all-encompassing privacy legislation. 07 Given the
burdens of making data protection effective, it is doubtful that the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada has the capacity to become re-
sponsible for all types of privacy issues and claims.'0 8
102. Privacy Act, R.S.C. ch. P-21 (1983).
103. An Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protec-
tion of Personal Information, Que. Stat. ch. 30 ('1982).
104. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 25
(1987).
105. See generally D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 30-39, 104-11, 175-81, 253-58,
321-24 (analysis of the goals of data protection in West Germany, Sweden, France, Ca-
nada, and the United States).
106. See COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, supra note 61, at 72 (recommending that the defi-
nition of "personal information" in the Privacy Act be broadened to include all types of
electronic surveillance and that the Privacy Commissioner be empowered to monitor recent
developments in surveillance practices).
107. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. ACCESS AND PRIVACY: THE STEPS AHEAD 3-4
(1987) ("The government believes that the Privacy Act, like similar legislation in other
countries, should concentrate on data protection matters and only regulate the collection,
use and disclosure of information about individuals produced by such surveillance and tests
[as polygraph and urinalysis].").
108. See D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 397-400. I have further developed this argu-
ment in Flaherty, Data Protection and National Information Policy, in FROM DATA PRO-
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The Canadian practice of formulating privacy rules as data
protection laws with accompanying ombudsmen to promote imple-
mentation is an admirable activity and should not be discouraged
by a process of allowing recourse to the courts. Although individu-
als need assistance in protecting their privacy rights against the
government, the private sector and other individuals should rely
on the courts for this protection only as a last resort, since they
are expensive and move slowly. The Privacy Commissioner of Ca-
nada, for example, not only assists and advises persons seeking
data protection but also monitors relevant technological and ad-
ministrative developments and conducts audits and investigations
of personal information practices. 09 There is no comparable inde-
pendent data protection office in Washington, D.C., or any state
capital. Additionally, the Privacy Commissioner resolves most
data protection problems before they reach the Federal Court of
Canada. 10 Given the costs of all litigation and the difficulties of
recovering legal costs in Canada,"' ombudsmen-style solutions are
generally preferable for the resolution of privacy problems.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The ultimate protection for the individual must lie in the con-
stitutional entrenchment of rights to privacy, data protection, and
informational self-determination. One can make a strong argu-
ment, even in the context of primarily seeking to promote data
protection, that having an explicit constitutional right to personal
privacy is a desirable goal in any society that has a meaningful
written constitution and a bill of rights. The purpose of creating a
constitutional right to privacy is not to leave data protection solely
TECTION TO KNOWLEDGE MACHINES: THE STUDY OF LAW AND INFORMATICS 29, 29-48 (P.
Seipel ed. 1990).
109. For a complete analysis of the Canadian Privacy Commissioner's powers, see D.
FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 259-62.
110. In his seven year term as the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, John Grace did
not bring a single case against a government institution before the Federal Court. This
means that "no recommendation of the Privacy Commissioner has been defied." PRIVACY
COMM'R OF CANADA, ANNUAL REP. PRIVACY COMMISSIONER 1989-90, at 9 (1990).
111. In the United States, plaintiffs can obtain attorney fees under certain state and
federal civil rights acts. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Attorneys can, in some in-
stances, also take cases on the basis of contingent fees. Neither avenue is generally availa-
ble in Canada. In fact, a losing party in Canada may have to pay the costs of the winner,
although this is rare in constitutional litigation. Moreover, recoveries for compensatory
damages in Canada are exceptionally low. Although one can argue for punitive damages in
charter litigation, it is relatively easy to avoid a jury trial in civil cases.
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to the courts, except for the interpretation of the necessary stat-
utes in cases of conflict but to allow individuals to assert privacy
claims in various arenas that extend beyond general and specific
data protection laws.
In Sweden, a government appointed committee recommended
the inclusion of protection against undue infringement on privacy
by means of electronic data processing in the constitutional cata-
logue of "fundamental freedoms and rights." Thereafter, the In-
strument of Government, the main constitutional document, was
amended to contain a provision on privacy, effective January 1,
1989.112 The Portuguese Constitution has recently been revised to
include a new provision, article 35, on data protection. This article
lists data protection rights in the form of a series of fair informa-
tion practices. 113
These European precedents pose the question for common
law countries of why a constitutional right to both informational
self-determination and data protection is needed. The idea seems
a strange one in North America. In Canada, data protection offi-
cials are officers of Parliament or the legislature, to which they
report directly. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada is appointed
for a fixed term and at a high salary to protect his or her indepen-
dence." 4 But Parliament could also amend the Privacy Act at the
behest of a majority government and even abolish the office. It
seems unlikely that there is a way to avoid this possibility in a
parliamentary democracy, absent constitutional entrenchment of a
right to data protection. However, even constitutional rights and
privileges are not useful in the face of efforts to subvert the goals
of legislation, such as those of Prime Minister Mulroney in ap-
pointing his former press attach6 to the office of Privacy
Commissioner.1 5
112. According to article three, "[e]very citizen shall to the extent more precisely
laid down by law be protected against infringements of his personal privacy by recording
information about him by automatic data processing." See Constitutional Provision on
Privacy, TRANSNAT'L DATA AND CoMm. REP., Feb. 1990, at 26, 26.
113. These include rights of access to personal information and prohibitions on the
storage of sensitive data and the assignment of all-purpose national identification numbers.
A translation appears in TRANSNAT'L DATA AND Comm. REP., June/July 1989, at 28.
114. Privacy Act, R.S.C. ch. P-21, §§ 53-54 (1983).
115. Bruce Phillips, formerly a leading journalist, played a partisan role on behalf of
the Prime Minister's office during the 1988 election campaign. Normally such an appoint-
ment would be cleared in advance by the three main political parties. In June 1990 the
opposition parties voted overwhelmingly against Phillips after an extended debate. See
HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, June 6, 1990, at 12341-12355; Id. June 7, 1990, at 12424-
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Of course, having a constitutional right to privacy is not a
panacea for all privacy problems, since courts are then put in a
position of balancing competing interests. As a California Court
of Appeals said in ruling that the preemployment drug testing
program of the Times-Mirror Corp. did not violate the state con-
stitution's right to privacy, "[A] court should not play the trump
card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely every assertion of
individual privacy.""' Commentators have frequently noted that
United States federal courts are more than capable of drawing
fine lines that end up being hostile to privacy.1 7 Canadian courts
have a similar capacity, as the Supreme Court's holding that indi-
viduals have lessened expectations of privacy at border crossings
demonstrates."' Yet privacy advocates can hardly expect more
than an informed consideration of competing interests, which may
result in a determination that privacy interests must occasionally
be sacrificed." 9 Moreover, as American experience again demon-
strates, Congress has not been reluctant to act in recent years to
overcome high court decisions that were, in its view, unnecessarily
restrictive of informational privacy rights. 20 There can be no bet-
ter resolution of significant privacy problems in democratic socie-
44. The government majority in the Senate subsequently approved the appointment in
1991, again with significant opposition.
116. Wilkinson v. Times-Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1046, 264 Cal. Rptr.
194, 202 (1989).
117. Reading American cases as a Canadian, one has to ask why one should trust
Canadian judges not to whittle away our legitimate expectations of privacy, as has hap-
pened in the United States. The positive response is that Canadian judges are moving in an
essential direction at the moment in establishing and explicating the basic right, which is a
necessary precondition to further application of this right in specific cases. The existence of
data protection laws and agencies facilitates reliance on the legislature and the privacy
ombudsmen to protect privacy, as opposed to litigation.
118. See Regina v. Simmons, 2 S.C.R. 495 (1988). The context was a strip search of
a woman at the border. The court stated that "[tihe degree of personal privacy reasonably
expected at customs is lower than in most other situations." However, the strip was still
found to have been conducted unreasonably. Id. at 497; see G.V. La Forest, supra note 88,
at 15-16.
119. In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta, 2 S.C.R. 1326 (1989), the Supreme Court
weighed the right of the press under the freedom of expression doctrine to publish details of
matrimonial cases more highly than the right to privacy. Yet Justice La Forest, writing for
three dissenters, was willing to extend privacy protection under the Charter to nongovern-
mental intrusions, including placing restrictions on the press.
120. Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 to create a pro-
tectable privacy interest in personal records held by banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1988).
In enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986, Congress rejected the
Supreme Court's conclusion in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that telephone
toll records are not entitled to privacy protection. See 18 U.S.C. § 3127 (1988).
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ties than for legislators to draw the line on the meaning of "rea-
sonable expectations" of privacy in specific sectors.
Finally, there is a pressing need for additional empirical re-
search on the impact of various privacy protection mechanisms,
since it seems evident that there are considerable problems in ac-
tually demonstrating the benefits of either a constitutional right to
privacy or a tort right, given the lack of appropriate research at
present.121 Privacy advocates need to do a better job of evaluating
the privacy protections that are already in place, just as we try to
fashion and promote new solutions for pressing problems.
121. See generally D. FLAHERTY, supra note 3 (demonstrating the benefits to indi-
viduals of statutory data protection rights).
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